ABSTRACT

This study was prompted by the numerous references to Isaac Newton and to Newtonian mechanics in general that can be found in the literature on American government and politics. So central is this Newtonian presence thought to be that it becomes mundane and controversial at the same time. Mundane in that Newtonianism has become a descriptive term commonly attached to American government and widely accepted as a valid characterization of its nature; and controversial in so far as the government's Newtonian properties are regarded as being so real that they are often thought to constitute a continuing crisis of adaptation in a political system threatened from within by the mechanical fixity of its own structures and processes. The American practice of enlisting the support of Newtonian science in the categorization of its government, therefore, is seen as a matter not merely of historical interest but also of contemporary social concern. And yet, notwithstanding the ready invocation of Newton's name and the habitual usage of Newtonian principles in connection with the values and practice of American government, the nature of the relationship remains obscure. It cannot be denied that Newtonian mechanics occupy a prominent position in American discourse on government and politics, and that they do so in such a way as to contribute powerfully to America's reputation of exceptionalism in relation to other Western democratic cultures. What requires clarification, however, is the precise meaning of Newtonian mechanics in the context of the American political experience and the level of significance that can be attributed to the existence of such a term in the conventional perspective of the American political system. The variety of references and allusions to the Newtonian legacy in the literature on American constitutional history and political analysis may well represent a distinguishing feature of American government, but it is one plagued with incoherence and ambiguity. So much so, in fact, that the impression left by much of what is written on Newtonianism in this field is that it is so ubiquitous, familiar, and self-evident as to require little or no explanation. As a result, it is left as a presence which is sensed rather than known, experienced rather than understood, and recognized rather than discovered.