ABSTRACT
The questions dealt with in any theoretical field-and similarly the corresponding sentences and assertions-can be roughly divided into object-questions and logical questions. (This differentia tion has no claim to exactitude; it only serves as a preliminary to the following non-formal and inexact discussion.) By objectquestions are to be understood those that have to do with the objects of the domain under consideration, such as inquiries re garding their properties and relations. The logical questions, on the other hand, do not refer directly to the objects, but to sen tences, terms, theories, and so on, which themselves refer to the objects. (Logical questions may be concerned either with the meaning and content of the sentences, terms, etc., or only with the form of these; of this we shall say more later.) In a certain sense, of course, logical questions are also object-questions, since they refer to certain objects-namely, to terms, sentences, and so onthat is to say, to objects of logic. When, however, we are talking of a non-logical, proper object-domain, the differentiation between object-questions and logical questions is quite clear. For instance, in the domain of zoology, the object-questions are concerned with the properties of animals, the relations of animals to one another and to other objects, etc.; the logical questions, on the other hand, are concerned with the sentences of zoology and the logical con nections between them, the logical character of the definitions occurring in that science, the logical character of the theories and hypotheses which may be, or have actually been, advanced, and so on.
