ABSTRACT
In his ethical theory Immanuel Kant differs both from those who maintain that the general prevalence of a desire leads directly to the duty of satisfying it, and, apparently at least, from those who base moral laws on intuitions which they discover in their own consciousness. While deriving the moral law from reason, Kant was overwhelmed by the awe and reverence it aroused in him. The notion of duty, as commonly conceived, implies that the contrary mode of conduct is wrong. The man who refrains from doing his duty is disapproved of, he who does his duty is not disapproved of. A host of critics have pointed out the impossibility of deriving moral obligation from the principle of mere formal self-consistency. In spite of his aversion to eudemonism, Kant cannot keep out the notion of happiness as an end. Another notion in Kant's ethics, of which the idea of happiness is a component part, has obviously a similar origin.
