We are not concerned here with any particular theories about the nature of past, present and future, or about our experience of these and of events and conditions as being in them, but with the epistemological conditions of all such theories. 1.e. this chapter is a discussion of the more general theory or attitude which sets the limits within which all such theories about time must fall. (Cf. page 33.)
For this reason, certain distinctions which would ordinarily be made between different meanings of 'time' need not beintroduced here, for instance the distinction between 'time' envisaged as a bird gliding over a series of hedgerows and 'time' envisaged as the hedgerows. Thus this chapter is not an erratic alternation between the discussion of time in one sense and time in various other senses, but is a discussion of the more general theory in terms of which alone it is possible to distinguish these various senses.