It may be objected that this approach is altogether misguided, and that we know very well that Mr. Baldwin was Prime Minister and that he was not Lord President, and that we ought to leave all these sophistications aside and devote ourselves in stead to finding out wherein a true statement of the facts differs from a false statement contrary to the facts. To this general objection the general answer is that it assumes the point which is in dispute. The same objection may be made in more particu lar form as follows. The objector will no doubt allow that it is in telligible to refer to the way of selecting and grouping in attention whose outcome is an experience of the political situation and of Mr. Baldwin as Prime Minister, because from the range open to us to select from (i.e. the ‘third kind of condition5 of page 148), we can select for attention ‘Mr. Baldwin in the position of Prime Minister5; but he will object that it is unintelligible to refer to a way of selecting and grouping whose outcome is an experience of the political situation with Mr. Baldwin as Lord President in 1936 because in the range open to us there is no Mr. Baldwin in that position. To this form of the objection the answer has already been given in Chapters 12, 14 and 16.1
The difference between the true and the false statements, or more precisely between the epistemological situations in which these statements are made and have their effects, can be described in the three ways indicated on page 179, as follows.