ABSTRACT
This chapter discusses that the state briefly the main essence of thought, and to justify its distinction from actual existence. An idea's factual existence may consist in a sensation or perception, just as well as in an image. Judgment is essentially the re-union of two sides, "what" and "that", provisionally estranged. But it is the alienation of these aspects in which thought's ideality consists. Thought has to accept, without reserve, the ideality of the "given", it's want of consistency and its self-transcendence. Thought, in its actual processes and results, cannot transcend the dualism of the "that" and the "what". A harmonious system of content predicating itself, a subject self-conscious in that system of content, this is what thought should mean. And the question is, therefore, whether philosophy does not end in sheer scepticism-in the necessity, that is, of asserting what it is no less induced to deny. The fact of thought desires a foreign perfection, is precisely the old difficulty.
