ABSTRACT
The general nature, in fact, of a thing's identity seems to lie, in avoidance of any absolute break in its existence, and, beyond that, to consist in some qualitative sameness which differs with different things. This chapter assumes that generally take a thing as possessing some kind of independence, and a sort of title to exist in its own right, and not as a mere adjective. But our ideas are usually not clear. A rainbow probably is not a thing, while a waterfall might get the name, and flash of lightning be left in a doubtful position. A thing is a thing, in short, by being what it was. And it does not appear how this relation of sameness can be real. It is a relation connecting the past with the present, and this connection is evidently vital to the thing. But, if so, the thing has become, in more senses than one, relation of passages in its own history.
