ABSTRACT
This chapter explains a number of non-literal senses of the phrase 'unconscious mental events', and tries to give a sufficient description of literally unconscious mental events. Such tests always assume the truth of some proposition connecting the diagnostic properties with those mentioned in the description; and any doubt about these propositions throws doubt on the test. Stumpf's argument is perfectly valid; and it is quite true that it does not, depend upon doubtful assumptions about the connexion between sensations and physiological stimuli. The psycho-analysts have many things of great interest to tell us about the emotional and conative factors which sometimes prevent sensations from developing into perceptions by preventing the usual traces from being excited or by inhibiting the usual results of such excitement. The notion of a conation involves as an essential factor the notion of a persistent something which joins up these relatively isolated bits of experience and reveals itself partially and imperfectly to me through them.
