ABSTRACT
It will, perhaps, be useful to set the scene for a better understanding of the developments with which this chapter will be dealing by an introduction to the events which led up to them. The fact that the US should have yielded to Israel’s request to implement Kissinger’s 1975 pledge on US consultation with Israel before submission of proposals for a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, dealt a heavy blow to the Egyptian negotiating position in Camp David. It was also the point at which Israel’s fortunes began to show an upturn, made possible by the following:
Sadat’s precipitate and rash presentation of his project “The Framework for Peace” at the very first working session of the Conference. This was a tactical error which ran counter to the strategy suggested to him by the Foreign Ministry 1 and my advice to him at the meeting of the National Security Council.
The United States failure to honour its pledge to show us its proposals prior to their submission, and to play the role as a full partner, with the parties concerned, to which it had committed itself.
