ABSTRACT
In 1914 Bertrand Russell reproached Bradley and the Idealists for their adherence to the classical tradition in philosophy and their consequent failure to adapt their thought to the scientific temper of the age. He obviously believed that he was himself developing a philosophy in harmony with this scientific temper, and, in the great stream of empiricist thought that has issued from the beginnings which he made, frequent claims have been asserted that philosophy had now become scientific. But these claims have never seriously been put to the test, and when investigated many of them prove to be groundless. Russell's own voluminous contribution and those of many others who have followed his methods and developed his ideas have run contrary to some of the most characteristic and significant trends in modern science, and have not infrequently been in conflict with their own professed empirical ideals. The purpose of this book is not polemical and the detailed critique of current doctrine implied in what follows will, for the most part, have to be inferred by the reader; but some brief statement here may serve to support the allegations made above.
