ABSTRACT
It is now possible to consider the general world-view arising out of the sciences we have discussed, the type of philosophy which the evidence best supports, and the metaphysical theories which it tends to validate. What is most obvious is that nothing in contemporary science supports or gives evidence of the truth of logical atomism or empiricism, for the facts of science are not logically independent one of another nor are the propositions stating them devoid of mutual entailment, and the modern scientific accounts of perception and intelligence are not consistent with the roles assigned to these functions in the empiricist theory of knowledge. The Anglo-Saxon philosophy of the first half of the twentieth century which has grown from these two roots has accordingly been out of keeping with the trend of scientific development. On the other hand, everything from physics to psychology emphasizes the holistic character of the reality studied, as well, at the same time, its fluidity and persistent developmental trend. The kind of philosophy which made the same emphases was that which contemporary empirical and linguistic analysis superseded. The British Idealists followed Hegelian lines, advocated dialectical logics and a holistic metaphysics; Samuel Alexander, J. C. Smuts, Lloyd Morgan and Henri Bergson, partly in reaction against the Idealists, expounded theories of process and evolutionary pluralism. Whitehead in large measure combined all these features and, like Hegel, attempted to reconcile pluralism with monism and process with holism. For each of these philosophies some counterpart can be found in modern scientific theories. To this type of thinking philosophy must return if it is to be consonant with contemporary science, and this is the direction it must take if it is to aspire to and to deserve the epithet ‘scientific’. A synthesis of the ideas severally explored by each of these philosophies which will remedy their several deficiencies is what must be sought. The Idealists (though not Hegel) tended to concentrate too exclusively upon consciousness and its attributes. Alexander and the Emergent-Evolutionists stressed a holism which still left emergence an inexplicable mystery. Bergson's elan was equally mysterious and though immaterial contrived to propel evolution endlessly onward, endlessly progressing towards no assignable end. Even Whitehead's impressive synthesis leaves the status of mind uncertain and the nature of concrescence obscure. These unsolved problems need fresh attention from a new philosophical movement that will redirect thinking into the channels so long dammed (as well as damned) by analytic philosophers.
