The nature of Kant’s argument
DOI link for The nature of Kant’s argument
The nature of Kant’s argument book
Second Analogy shows that for Kant the real crux of his doctrine is to be found here. In such a case people are entitled to demand that the argument offered them should be water-tight. Kant is certainly presupposing that space and time are forms of sensibility, and that appearances given under the forms of space and time are therefore not things-in-themselves, but appearances of things-in-themselves to human minds. He also believes all objective combination and connexion of appearances to be determined by a transcendental synthesis of imagination working through the medium of time. The Second Analogy may certainly be described as a rule which makes a particular kind of combination in the manifold necessary. People should expect him to say either that it distinguishes an appearance as object from every other idea apprehended or that it distinguishes the apprehension of an appearance as object from every other kind of apprehension.