ABSTRACT
This chapter explains that Kant's distinction between the phenomenal and noumenal self, between mans empirical and intelligible character, raises far fewer difficulties than his general distinction between appearances and things-in-themselves. That certain supersensible entities lie behind the things which become known to human minds is indeed a wholly unwarranted hypothesis. The chapter examines that there are those who might wish to reject Kant's moral theory off-hand, on the ground that it conceives of the non-sensible self as a plain matter of fact. The reasoning upon which Kant relies in his examination of Rational Psychology contains nothing essentially new. Kant adopts in his theoretical philosophy a rigidly anti-metaphysical point of view. The first point to be noted is that, according to Kant, practical reason reveals to us one fact and one fact only, namely, the moral law itself. Many critics have argued that Kant cannot be allowed to be in real earnest in the attack he delivers upon speculative metaphysics.
