Objectivity in Morals
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Objectivity in Morals book
All those moral philosophers who find the ultimate basis of morality in man's psychological constitution, in his basic desires or emotions or dispositions, are subjectivists, on this criterion. A more restrictive definition of subjectivism would be that a subjectivist is one who, whenever he says 'X is good', means 'I like (or approve of, or desire) X'. But I think that one can say of many other views than this, that they propound a subjective basis for morality. Emotivism, for example, which alleges that sentences of the form 'X is good' cannot be translated into sentences of the form 'I like X', nevertheless maintains that such sentences only express or seek to evoke feelings. This is a subjective theory of morality, not in the sense that it analyses moral statements as statements about the speaker's subjective states, but in the wider sense that moral statements are said to be solely founded upon men's subjective feelings. That is, what makes the statement 'X is good' correct in a certain society is not anything about X as an independently existing object, but something about all the members of the society who accept it-about their feelings towards X.