ABSTRACT
Moroccan policy, which ignores the Agreement with France, the great event of his reign. When at one moment it looked as if M. Rouvier, driven by fear, was ready to sacrifice the Entente, King Edward must have done his best to appear as France’s firm support. As far as can be ascertained here, the French seem to have lost their first fear and to have assumed a distinctly Anglophil attitude. Since they feel surer than before of British help, our negotiations with France may have to go slower and be more difficult to complete. Nevertheless, if this assumption is correct, I think quiet, continuous pressure on the French will be the best way to attain our wishes in Morocco. The prospect of reaching a general agreement with France about Morocco seems unfortunately to be becoming more remote. The increase of self-confidence on the subject, which is inspired in them by England, may give rise to a serious situation before or during the Conference. A trial of strength to the point of bending or breaking would involve a greater danger to peace than the first time. But it may be assumed that fear would again grip them in Paris; but if the French go mad and allow it to come to a war, they will, even without a treaty, find England’s armed power on their side. In England the Morocco question has come to mean a fight for the friendship of France, and in order to keep this and also to prevent a predominant German hegemony over Europe they would venture on a war.
