ABSTRACT

The assassination of the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand by Serbian nationalists during his visit to Sarajevo on 28 June 1914 set in train a series of events which led, within five to six weeks, to the outbreak of the First World War. Imperial Germany's own responsibility for this calamity is still the subject of intense historical controversy, and it is not the intention to retrace this debate in any great detail here. 1 Suffice it to say that in offering Austria-Hungary a blank cheque to deal with Serbia as it saw fit, Germany's leaders at the very least took a conscious risk that the two Central Powers might become embroiled in a war with Russia, Serbia's main protector in Europe. On top of this, German military strategy — based on the Schlieffen Plan of 1905 — meant that a war with Russia would very likely have to begin with a knockout blow against France, Russia's ally, in order to overcome the obvious disadvantages of a prolonged two-front campaign. The violation of Belgian neutrality — another product of the Schlieffen Plan — in turn ensured that Britain would enter the war on the side of Russia and France. After the breakdown of diplomatic negotiations, the final unravelling of this process took place between 30 July (Russian mobilisation in support of Serbia) and 4 August (Britain's declaration of war on Germany). 2