ABSTRACT
One of the most important consequences of the great Eastern crisis of 1875-78 was that Bismarck came gradually to the conclusion that the loose alignments of the 1870s, which had for a decade permitted him to stay passively in the background while international tensions were safely deflected to the periphery of the continent, could no longer give Germany security. The German Empire might well be the strongest power in Europe, but it was not a hegemonial power, and Bismarck was in no position, at home or abroad, to adopt the tone of Napoleon I. The exclusion of Gladstones influence from the Near East was one thing on which all three governments were agreed; and even if the isolation of France was primarily Bismarcks preoccupation, and if Gladstone's contribution to the destruction of the Anglo-Austrian entente had been perhaps even greater than Bismarcks, the Three Emperors Alliance had undoubtedly dug a ditch between Austria and the Western Powers.
