ABSTRACT
As they reflected upon the war in their memoirs, Charles I’s former generals and civilian advisers were largely in agreement that the siege of Gloucester had been a fundamental strategic mistake. 1 However, as has been explained in Chapter IX, all the alternatives were problematic. Also, there were important benefits that would have resulted from the city’s capture. In the first place it was to be invested, not stormed, so casualties would be much lower than had been the case at Bristol. Moreover, the siege would provide a breathing space during which the regiments mauled at the storming of Bristol could be recruited. Third, its capture would complete the conquest of the lower Severn valley, thus allowing all the resources of that part of the country and of much of South Wales to be used to supply and reinforce the field army. Admittedly, the expected short duration of the siege would not give time for the armies of the north and the west to complete their operations against Hull and the Parliamentary garrisons in Devonshire, thus permitting them to play a full part in national strategy. However, the capture of Gloucester might encourage the regional commands to speed up their operations while possibly undermining the morale of their opponents. Only in retrospect was setting siege to Gloucester seen as bait to lure the Earl of Essex’s army into a battle in open country, where it could be intercepted and destroyed. There is little doubt therefore that the king was genuine in the words he addressed to the representatives of the city before the siege started to the effect that they had no prospect of relief: ‘Waller is extinct and Essex cannot come’. 2 However, against all expectations, Parliament managed to assemble a well-equipped and well-motivated army to go to the relief of Gloucester.
