ABSTRACT
Field army activity in England and Wales during the winter and early spring of 1645 followed a similar overall pattern to that of previous years; the infantry were largely rested and recruited, while the cavalry played a more active role, sometimes being employed on military operations at a considerable distance from army headquarters. The Royalist high command was, on the whole, more vigorous in its use of resources from the centre to support initiatives elsewhere, but for a number of reasons both sides were more restrained than in previous years. In the first place, for most of the troops the 1644 campaigning season had been far more exhausting than in previous years. Essex’s army was almost continually on the move from mid-May to mid-November, as were Waller’s cavalry and dragoons. Manchester’s troops had had a quiet patch between mid-July and the beginning of September, but they had fought in two major battles and taken part in several sieges. There is therefore little doubt that the cries of distress from Skippon, Cromwell and other generals during November were real ones. Their troops had suffered as never before from shortage of food, rest and pay; they could not be relied upon to perform at their best, or indeed to perform at all, until at least some of their needs had been satisfied. Similarly, the king’s and Prince Maurice’s armies had been in the field since mid-May. They had marched even longer distances and taken part in some very heavy fighting. Even allowing for a measure of special pleading, Lord Goring’s account of the lack of enthusiasm in what was left of Maurice’s infantry when it took the field again after no more than a month’s rest rings true:
I esteem myself very unhappy to be diverted from the pursuit of a distracted enemy by that which of itself is a greater misfortune … a universal deadness and backwardness in the officers of foot to undertake any action without refreshment. 1
