ABSTRACT
The signing of the DOP in September 1993 made it possible for Israeland its Arab neighbours to move ahead bilaterally. Jordan’s KingHussein saw the DOP as a great achievement not only because it looked like a two-state solution was in reach but also because the PLO was now able to negotiate directly with Israel. This ended decades of Jordan being either compelled to speak for the Palestinians or being seen as a solution to the Palestinian problem. It now allowed Jordan to follow its own national interests. In comparison, Syria’s President Asad saw the DOP as a disaster as it undermined Arab unity and the pursuit of a comprehensive peace. He believed that the Palestinians would have received a better deal if Israel had been required to negotiate multilaterally, especially with respect to refugees and the right of return. However, at the same time, Asad saw the DOP as freeing Syria from its pan-Arab obligations and, like Jordan, placing it in the position to pursue its own agenda. Whether the DOP was a good or bad deal for the Palestinians was now Arafat’s problem. Syria had to focus on the return of the Golan Heights. Thus, shortly after the signing of the DOP both Jordan and Syria started to negotiate bilaterally with Israel. The Jordanian-Israeli talks quickly ended in a full peace treaty. In fact they were the most amicable and least contentious negotiations of the whole Middle East peace process. The opposite was true for the Syrian-Israeli talks. Twice they came close to an agreement; twice they collapsed in accusations and counter-accusations.
