ABSTRACT
This chapter lists the postulates to clarify the distinction that is being proposed between semantics and pragmatics. It explains that the postulates have prima-facie plausibility. A better-known example of pragmaticism is Searle's speechact theory, summarized in his suggestion that a 'theory of language is part of a theory of action'. In addition to illocutionary acts, Searle envisages grammatical acts of various kinds; in other words, he notionally translates the grammatical system into the performance of various speech acts. The chapter associates the rules of grammar with Searle's concept of 'constitutive rules', and the principles of pragmatics with his concept of 'regulative rules'. The rules of grammar are fundamentally conventional; the principles of pragmatics are fundamentally non-conventional, iemotivated in terms of conversational goals. The sense is conventional, in that it is deducible from the rules of grammar; but the force is arrived at by means of motivated principles such as the Cooperative Principle (CP).
