ABSTRACT
The war against France became globalized in two stages. In 1793–94, British ministers agreed to attack the French West Indian islands in order to gain political leverage in Europe, to put pressure on Paris, and to neutralize French power in the Caribbean. The key objective of ruining French overseas trade, which was heavily dependent upon the West Indies, was however difficult to balance against the costs. Holding the islands taken from France turned out to be far more expensive in manpower and money than the British estimated would be the case. An intended coup de main became an increasingly damaging military drain by 1795–97. On the French side, aggrandizement in Europe, especially with the effective takeover of the Netherlands in 1795, easily compensated for Caribbean losses. Worse for Britain, the capitulation of the Low Countries to France opened the way to an extension, not contraction, of France’s global empire. The British government therefore was compelled to expand the war from early 1795 to prevent France – now an expansionist power rather than a revolutionary regime teetering on the brink of collapse, as it appeared to be in 1793 – from gaining Dutch possessions which might threaten British interests. Even more than the Caribbean intervention, this new initiative deployed the strength, self-confidence, and strong war-fighting record of the Royal Navy to best advantage.
