ABSTRACT
As at two earlier points in the long conflict – first after the general pacification that followed the Palatinate wars and then after the imposition of imperial authority which resulted from the defeat of Christian IV of Denmark and his allies – the Peace of Prague of 1635 seemed to present an opportunity for a united German Empire to iron out its problems and to control its own destiny in the stillness of peace desired by all Germans. The invitation to both France and Sweden to accede to the treaty was a serious one, generally recognized as indispensable to the immediate cessation of all hostilities. Indeed, if just one of the two had accepted, the same result still could have been expected, since no extensive campaigning in Germany was possible for either without the cooperation of the other. Sweden, in fact, considered signing the treaty as a way of escaping military commitments in Germany in the face of a looming war with Denmark and the expiration of its truce with Poland. But Denmark was temporarily bought off by the cession of Bremen and France – grimly determined to continue its harassment of the Habsburgs – helped to mediate a twenty-five-year extension of the Polish truce, thus freeing the Swedes to pursue their double objective of compensation and retention of north German territories.
