ABSTRACT
The two preceding chapters have shown how the Eastern question revealed a gulf between Russia and Germany, and how this fact had not prevented Bismarck from securing colonial advantages at the expense of both Britain and France during the years 1884–85. The explanation lies in the system, originated by Bismarck in the early seventies, which continued developing until 1914, the system of the great European alliances. This remarkable arrangement of international checks and balances for a long time preserved peace among the peoples, but by the very fact of its existence ultimately engendered strife. For the system was one of competing alliances, not of a universal league. It was a Balance, not a Concert, of Power. As one combination strengthened or developed, its growth alarmed other states outside its orbit and mechanically produced a counter-combination. Competing alliances produced competing armaments, and the rivalry of hatred and of fear ended in the two opposed groups carrying their competition to the battlefield. In 1914, when it seemed clear that war was inevitable, the German Foreign Under-Secretary ‘expressed regret that Germany, France “and perhaps England” had been drawn in—none of whom wanted war in the least and said that it came from “this d—d system of alliances, which were the curse of modern times.” 1 He forgot that Bismarck had been the chief architect of the alliance system. 2
