ABSTRACT
The Ṭā’if agreement of October 1989, approved by 58 of the surviving deputies originally elected in May 1972, marked the beginning of the end of the long Lebanese civil war which had lasted since 1975. It was a modified version of the 1943 national pact and followed the lines of the 1985 Damascus agreement. The agreement provided for a united Lebanon, equal representation for Christians and Muslims in the enlarged chamber of deputies, reduced powers for the (Maronite) president and increased powers for the (Sunnī) prime minister, the cabinet and the (Shiī‛ī) speaker of the chamber. Like the national pact itself, it was presented as a temporary arrangement until the ideal of a non-confessional system could be achieved in Lebanon. The big Lebanese winners under Tā’if were the Sunnīs who, with Sa‛ūdī support, had achieved a position of power out of all proportion to their numbers or influence; the big losers were the Maronites, who had lost their former privileged position, and the Shi‛īs, whose demand for an immediate non-confessional system which would enable them to exploit their numbers was rejected.
