ABSTRACT
Economics today is one of the most developed and all-encompassing social sciences, with distinct imperialist tendencies. It not only aims at explaining phenomena in the realm of ‘the economy’, but also across all social domains, and even extends its ambitions to the life sciences (Noë et al. 2001). This is possible because economics perceives itself to be a universal logic of analysis, enshrined in mathematical formalisms, implying no particular material reference. This claim is not limited to the so-called ‘mainstream’ models of rationality and optimization, but also applies to ‘mainstream pluralism’ (Davis 2006): for example, behavioural economics may appear to correct the standard model of homo economicus, but may itself be interpreted as a considerable extension of the economic argument into previously unrelated areas, such as neurosciences, leading to claims that ‘neuroeconomics’ actually also means to apply economics in the neurosciences (Glimcher 2003). These developments very quickly turn out to imply a new, overarching paradigm seeking to integrate game-theoretic logic and various behavioural foundations of economic action supported by experimental evidence (see, for example, Gintis 2007, 2009).
