ABSTRACT
As discussed in the previous chapter, in the aftermath of the 2006 missile and nuclear tests, the perceived risks associated with North Korea—galvanized within Japan’s political elite and mediated to the wider society (primarily through the mass media)—were enough to maintain Pyongyang’s negative framing in the immediate months and years that followed. The phenomenon of a conspicuous emphasis upon risks framed against the DPRK was also sustained through the lack of a satisfactory resolution to the abduction issue and continued speculation over the specifics of the nuclear programs in the Northern half of the peninsula. This chapter elucidates how, in the wake of further missile and nuclear tests during 2009, the processes driving the recalibration of risk in response to North Korea largely maintained their momentum up to the aftermath of those events. Ultimately, however, the empirical evidence analyzed here, particularly with reference to Pyongyang’s further provocations in 2010 and beyond (covered in the following chapter), also points to the emergence of a phenomenon of saturation across political, media, and societal spheres. This is witnessed in terms of the reaction from each of these sectors in response to the kitachōsen mondai in Japan—and appears to have manifest itself in the establishment of a new equilibrium with regards to how North Korea is now framed, and how risks associated with the DPRK are calibrated.
