As with previous events identified as influential upon Japan’s responses to North Korea, the extent, level, and trajectory of the impact of particular recent incidents can, to a certain degree, be quantified through comparisons of the volume of coverage. This is particularly relevant in the case of the Diet and media sources because, as noted, systematic random sampling demonstrates the overwhelmingly convergent emphasis on portrayed risks and—though not uniform— negative framing of North Korea across these sectors assigned to each case study covered. Table 8.1, below, highlights the impact of three further examples that would, in light of the case studies observed above (pertaining to events occurring between 1993 and 2009), be expected to accentuate the established process of risk recalibration within Japan in response to North Korea—and further compound its negative framing. Indeed, their impact does little to evince a significant reduction in the calibration of risks attached to the DPRK when analyzed as a combined effect. It is, however, also problematic to make an empirically convincing case for these events having been utilized to further inflate risks to a significantly higher level. As such, what can be seen is the tentative emergence of a new equilibrium, in terms of the process of risk recalibration framed against North Korea having come to fruition—and having become established as a kind of proxy-norm within political, market, and societal spheres in Japan. The absence, therein, of an additional major shift vis-à-vis the DPRK is, as explicated below, corroborated by qualitative and quantitative data relating to key events occurring after those of the missile and nuclear tests conducted in April, May, and July 2009.