ABSTRACT
Ontological, epistemological and theoretical versions of the mind-body problem are distinguished. Block’s (1994) analysis of positions on the mind-body problem, or ‘attitudes to the explanatory gap’, is described: that there is no gap, that there is an unclosable gap, and that there is a closable gap. The thesis is advanced that these positions are all correct but that each applies to a different version of the problem. Thus, the correct position on the ontological problem is that there is no gap (there is only one world); on the epistemological problem is that there is an unclosable gap (there is an irresolvable duality); and on the theoretical problem that there is a closable gap. On this view, the ontological problem is straightforwardly soluble, the epistemological problem is straightforwardly insoluble and the theoretical problem is soluble but not straightforwardly. Attempts to solve the theoretical or scientific problem are discussed. It is concluded that, contrary to current opinion, the solution to this form of the hard problem is within our grasp, and that approaches at the sub-atomic level offer most promise.
