ABSTRACT
This chapter presents the chief doctrines of George Frederick Stout's philosophical psychology, particularly those which may have a bearing on current issues in cognitive science. Stout was particularly influenced by Herbart’s concept of apperception and the possibility of a dynamic theory of knowledge; and by Bradley and Ward’s critiques of the associationist doctrine, for its particularity and atomism. Stout reformulated the Law of Association in two ways, one of which was by introducing the principle of Relative Suggestion, which foreshadows stimulus and response generalisation. Mace addresses the issue of the relation of Stout to Gestalt psychology in the preface to the fourth edition of the Manual: to claim ‘anticipation’ would be ungenerous and inaccurate. It would be truer to say that from the time of his earliest writings Professor Stout was in sympathetic accord with the reaction against the sensationalistic tradition, and in part on the grounds which have led to the more developed form of the Gestalt psychology.
