ABSTRACT
This paper addresses some of the chief conceptual problems associated with the study of conscious experience. (1) Conceptual confusion and lack of clarity of the term ‘consciousness’ itself, including doubts as to whether it constitutes a natural kind, and confusion between different types. (2) Privacy: the claim that conscious experience cannot be studied scientifically on account of its subjectivity. The distinction between subjective and objective is re-examined and the universally inferential nature of scientific statements stressed. Methods for the study of pain are examined in detail, exemplifying the objectification of a prototypically subjective experience. (3) Epiphenomenalism: the view that an adequate account of mental life can be given without reference to consciousness because the latter plays no causal role in the control of behaviour. The primacy of conscious experience is stressed as is its centrality to mental health. It is concluded that the study of conscious experience is both possible, even if from a third person perspective and necessary, on account of its importance for psychological well-being.
