ABSTRACT
At the close of 1938, the option for solving the Palestine problem via partition was laid, at least temporarily, to rest. By the end of 1937, in response to pressures from the Foreign Office, the British government had begun to backtrack from the partition policy that it had adopted only a few months previously. This was primarily due to the vehement Arab stance in Palestine and throughout the Arab world against partition, and the apprehension that British interests would be severely damaged as a result — especially in the event of an imminent European conflagration (which was already in the air). In such a case, the Arab world would be arrayed alongside Britain's foes, if Britain chose to implement partition in Palestine. The Colonial Office and its head, who supported the partition plan, found it difficult to contend with the position of the Foreign Office. Accompanying the terms of reference given to the Partition Commission, requesting that the Commission recommend boundaries for two homogeneous countries and their population to the maximum extent possible without any forcible transfer, was a secret letter that the government sent to the Commission's chairman. In this letter, the government also allowed the Commission to recommend that ‘no scheme of partition that they could devise was likely to prove practicable’. A joint reading of the terms of reference and the secret letter may shed light on the finding that the government expected the Commission to arrive at. Even before the Commission departed for Palestine, the Foreign Office believed that the partition plan would be imminently rescinded and was confident that the Commission would rule that the plan was impracticable. Clarifications in this vein were also provided to the Arab capitals. 1
