ABSTRACT
Part Two begins with a reminder of Part One’s thesis that there must be a positive principle behind moral evil, an “active and opposing cause of evil” (6:57). As we have discussed, Kant’s “Theodicy” rejects the view that our moral failures should be understood through a privation model whereby our misdeeds are the result of a limitation, incapacity, or a deficient development of the “seed of goodness.” At the start of Part Two, Kant also reiterates his earlier claim that it would be a mistake to treat our natural inclinations as the principal cause of our immorality. He further adds to this that those who do see immorality in this way are not merely making a philosophical error, but a practical one. Even though moral continence is relevant to Kant, and is central to his understanding of virtue, this is not where our fundamental moral struggle lies. Thus, those who struggle to master their appetites are engaged in more of a side skirmish rather than the central battle against their Propensity to Evil.
