The statement from XX (Anonymous) draws our attention to secondary victimization, or the additional and adjacent forms of victimization that take place after or amidst primary victimization, such as when a victim is blamed, not believed, depicted as the ‘real’ perpetrator, or in a range of other ways finds they cannot attest the wrong they have suffered. In this regard, the second statement I want to cite is from Lyotard’s book The Differend, which I situate in this chapter as an important text for thinking about feminism and the politics of sexual victimization. Lyotard (1988) writes, ‘It is in the nature of a victim not to be able to prove that one has been done a wrong’ (No. 9).2 In his book Lyotard proposes a unique theory of the victim as one who has suffered a wrong that is not presently recognized in law and exists instead as a ‘differend’, or a form of suffering that cannot be phrased in a shared idiom. Where ‘vulnerability’ refers to the ability to be wounded, Lyotard’s theory of the victim points up a second-order vulnerability: the ability to be wounded and to then have that wounding effaced, in language, by others, by the law. In this chapter I draw on Lyotard’s theory to think about feminist efforts to reform rape law and ameliorate its effacement of various forms of rape. Though Lyotard does not discuss rape law, its notoriously attenuated codifications of ‘real rape’, which serve to exclude certain forms of rape from law-worthiness and recognition, provide powerful examples of the scenario of effaced suffering Lyotard sought to illuminate in The Differend. Rape law is replete with differends, and, accordingly, feminist efforts to reform rape law correspond to the kind of political work Lyotard describes as ‘bearing witness to the differend’ (No. 22, original emphasis) – political work that endeavours to counter the linguistic, cultural and legal effacement of particular forms of suffering, through the invention of new idioms that give suffering visibility.