Spiegelberg argues that there is neither such a thing as a system or school of phenomenology, nor is there a solid body of teachings that allow us to give an exact answer to the question ‘What is phenomenology?’ For him, it is illusory to assume that there exists a unified philosophy denoted by the term phenomenology: ‘Phenomenologists are much too individualistic in their habits to form an organized “school”’ (Spiegelberg 1982: xxvii). This extensive individuality is enough to convince him that ‘There are as many phenomenologies as there are phenomenologists’ and to arrive at the following conclusion: ‘It is certainly true that, on closer inspection, the varieties exceed the common features’ (ibid.). This diversity and ambiguity raises a number of critical questions: are phenomenologists really so different and diverse? If so, how do we understand them as ‘phenomenologist’? Is there anything in common? Don't they share some concerns and ideas in common? Are phenomenologists essentially diverse or they are just dissimilar? Can we find a secure common ground in phenomenology?