ABSTRACT
Humeans might grant that normative realism makes possible a somewhat stronger conclusion about morality's authority than they can provide, but insist that it does so at a much higher metaphysical and epistemological cost than it makes sense for anyone to pay. It can be tempting to argue that Donald Davidson's realism makes possible a much stronger inescapability claim than Humean constructivism does. What worries Christine Korsgaard about Humean constructivism is rather the procedure with which it would have people construct the truth about their reasons. Contractualists are not seeking to construct the truth about morality out of the bare concept of mutual respect. Contractarian theories can take several forms, but what they share is the claim that people have only instrumental reasons to make and keep agreements. Kantian constructivists, however, are not proposing that the Categorical Imperative is the fundamental normative principle from which all normative truths can be derived.
