ABSTRACT
This chapter deals with the internal workings of the Naxal insurgency by throwing light on its recruitment strategy, task allocation, role performance, and dynamics of allegiance. It offers an incisive assessment of the counter-strategy of the state, locating it within three criteria: location, isolation, and eradication of insurgents. The chapter discusses the much-acknowledged Andhra model and concludes that the development/security framework of the Indian state has been ineffective in dealing with the Naxal insurgency due to weak state institutional presence in Naxal-affected states, contrary to the Kautilyan advice of developing effective governance to quell internal dissent. Neither has the Gandhian model of conflict transformation made any headway in the Naxal-affected areas. The state response to the Naxal conflict clearly reveals that the inability of the state to enter into dialogue with the Naxal leaders, to gain commitment on a ceasefire across India, and carry it out within the framework of talks, has limited its ability to counter violence.
