ABSTRACT
This conclusion presents some closing thoughts on the concepts covered in the preceding chapters of this book. The book states that the link between Helmut Schmidt and George Shultz underscores the continuity of cooperative security policies from Willy Brandt to Ronald Reagan. The economic dimension of détente played a pivotal role in this process. Trade and antagonistic cooperation with authoritarian states was inevitable and in fact necessary to buy human contacts facilitating the prospects for liberalizing changes. NATO maintained its dual-track policy until the end of the East-West conflict and beyond. Strength and diplomacy went together. Thus, Cold War triumphalism is inappropriate and in fact misleading. Shultz and Dobrynin found common ground by putting together an inventory of bilateral US-Soviet agreements. Economic détente remained a key dimension in the entire process of Europe's transformation. It facilitated a state-induced Helsinki effect from above: it was a way to reconcile stabilization and liberalization.
