ABSTRACT
This chapter gives a clear account of key aspects of Robert Kane’s libertarian theory of free will. It includes some contrast with rival agent-causal and simple-indeterminist libertarian theories and notes why Kane prefers his approach to these other brands of libertarianism. It gives an account of “self-forming acts (SFAs)” which are the basic, underivatively free acts which serve as the foundation for all our other free and responsible actions. The problem of luck is considered and it is noted how Kane appeals to his theory of “dual efforts of will” in the attempt to solve this problem. The dual efforts of will are also explained as contributing to what Kane calls “plural voluntary control,” a kind of control which compatibilist theories of free will cannot provide. For purposes of clarification, the chapter contrasts Kane’s event-causal libertarian theories with some of the other event-causal libertarian theories, such as the modest libertarianism described but not endorsed by Daniel Dennett and Alfred Mele, Laura Ekstrom’s view, and Mark Balaguer’s view. This chapter concludes with a brief discussion of Kane’s admission that while he finds the libertarian view to be coherent, he believes we lack sufficient evidence for the existence of libertarian free will.
