ABSTRACT
This and subsequent chapters provide a pragmatic/moral defense for belief in libertarian free will. Chapter Six begins by noting that compatibilism is significantly problematic while libertarianism is a coherent view which may be true. It is argued that while we lack sufficient empirical or metaphysical or logical evidence to show that we have such libertarian free will, there is also no convincing evidence that we lack it. This raises the question of what we should believe and how we should live. Should we live and act as if we have the kind of free will which grounds just desert or not? In this chapter, it is argued that those philosophers who deny we have such desert-grounding free will, such as Derk Pereboom, Gregg Caruso, and Bruce Waller, hold views which lead to significant problems concerning issues of criminal justice which threaten the rights and dignity of persons. The argument made here borrows some ideas from Saul Smilansky and puts them to work in new ways.
