ABSTRACT
This chapter identifies and discusses another puzzle that arises from self-control: how is it possible for it to be lost by agents who are capable of voluntary action? Such losses seem to be routine, but why would an agent act contrary to their own judgment? We canvass various responses. The first and most venerable denies that self-control is ever lost in such circumstances: on the Socratic view, the person retains control, but suffers from a cognitive illusion and mistakes the smaller reward for the greater. But this response seems to fly in the face of common experience. The second response, almost as venerable as the first, does better on this score. It divides the person into competing parts, and explains loss of self-control as a result of the rational self being overpowered by more emotional components. It faces the problem of explaining how such actions are truly voluntary. The third response explains loss of self-control as arising from competing judgments. This response seems to struggle to explain how a loss of self-control can occur in what we call a “clear-eyed” case, in which the person fully understands how they ought to act, and yet acts in a conflicting manner. We set out the costs and benefits of these approaches without attempting to adjudicate between them.
