ABSTRACT
This chapter discusses a rich picture of Christopher Boorse's concept of health that provides a suitable framework from which to evaluate the critical replies to his account. It analyzes distinctions between mechanism, part-functionalism, and organic functional holism to reveal that Boorse is a part-functionalist. The chapter explains four senses of "objectivism"—metaphysical objectivism, methodological objectivism, disciplinary objectivism, and dialectical objectivism—to reveal that Boorse is a combination of metaphysical objectivism and dialectical objectivism. It discusses the details of how Boorse understands numerous technical aspects of his concept of health. Boorse labels his naturalistic concept of health as "theoretical," "biostatistical," and "functional,’’ suggesting that these labels are synonymous. Graves' disease illustrates the point of Boorse's qualification concerning age and sex. The basic idea of Boorse's sense of "dispositional" is captured in Robert Cummins's dispositional account of function. Boorse's concept of disease is understood in terms of the absence of pathological conditions.
