ABSTRACT
Chapter 3 examines how J.G. Fichte takes up the question of conversion in his first and second introductions to the “New Presentation” of the Wissenschaftslehre (1797/98). Like Kant, Fichte is interested in how people transform from one basic character type to another. Like Schelling, Fichte conceives of these types in terms of two practical-theoretical categories: “dogmatism” (people who believe and act as though human cognition can be explained in terms of causal relations between things) and “idealism” (people who believe and act as though human cognition depends on the spontaneous activity of a human subject). While idealism and dogmatism are philosophical positions, Fichte—following Schelling—claims that they are also practical dispositions. In this chapter we argue (against commentators like Daniel Breazeale and Allen Wood) that Fichte thinks conversion from dogmatism to idealism is non-rational. We motivate this conclusion through an analysis of Fichte’s account of “proof.” While Fichte believes that idealist accounts of cognition are correct, he is quick to emphasize that they are rationally inaccessible to those who have yet to acquire a certain kind of character. This character, Fichte suggests, is acquired through a criterionless choice. Thus, Fichte—like Schelling—is what we call a Spontaneous Choice theorist.
