ABSTRACT
W E have said previously that the predicate of the judgment, "It is a trunk/' is not an idea but a fact.1 The tree trunk seen is actually the tree trunk which exists.
If it were an idea, it could not have belonged to fact. Bradley says in his Principles of Logic that the predicate is an idea cut loose from existence. If it is really what once was mental, what process could have turned it into fact? When I perceive a red rose and make the judgment, "The rose is red/' the red is an existent entity. It belongs to the rose. If it were merely an idea cut loose from my mental image, then the image must belong not only to my mind but to the object also before me. Otherwise, the red could not belong to the rose. If so, the object should be bodily in my mind-which is absurd. If the image of a horse as mental cannot be yoked to the cart between the shafts, even an idea cut loose from my mind cannot be so yoked.
