ABSTRACT
For urban industries, the main content of the Chinese revolution was an extension of socialist management. In the 1950s the CCP distributed its few trusted accountants (and many demobilized soldiers wanting urban sinecures) into corporations that “supervised” factories but were often located in offices physically far away from production sites or stores. During the Cultural Revolution, planning largely capsized, without planners. “Property rights” (chanquan) include rights to sell, manage, regulate, or get income from assets. The reform era saw some lessening of official regulation/supervision, as well as less restrictive concepts of corruption (defined as a sense that the ‘wrong’ people receive benefits). More “managers’ responsibility” ironically gave some cadres disincentives to manage, during the inflationary 1980s. If a factory made marketable “hot products” (rexiao shangpin), “mother-in-law” (‘popo’) supervisors often confiscated them by declaring them within mandatory quotas. Leasing became a prominent form of quasi-ownership, e.g., after the state auctioned long-term urban land leases at high rates. Collective and “dependent” enterprises prospered more than state or private firms did.
