ABSTRACT
The conception of the scope and limitations of Swiss neutrality at the time of its origin and development differed markedly from that of today; it may be described as looser, broader and vaguer. In order to obtain a precise idea of it, we must survey the earlier practise of neutrality as a whole, and deduce its essential features from that survey. For while the Diet took no pains to provide any clear definition of neutrality in its official pronouncements, international law, then in its infancy, did not remedy the defect. The members of the Diet certainly spoke from time to time of “traditional neutrality” as “the fundament of the Confederate Republic,” or called neutrality “the pillar of its peace,” but further definition was cautiously avoided. It is true that international lawyers of the time—Grotius in Holland or Emer de Vattel of Neuchatel, who was more familiar with conditions in Switzerland—sought to find a place for neutrality in their systems, but they did so quite superficially and the position of Switzerland was merely alluded to. Practice hastened ahead of theory. It is notable that the Swiss practice of neutrality was governed by stricter principles than its doctrine in international law, and indeed the idea of a more absolute neutrality was first conceived and put into practice in Switzerland. We may even regard the development of the idea of absolute neutrality as a specifically Swiss contribution to European international law.
