ABSTRACT
This chapter focuses on a number of attempted 'straight' solutions to the sceptical argument, solutions which try to meet the sceptic head on by giving an account of the facts which constitute meaning. It concentrates on Jerry Fodor's 'asymmetric dependency' account of meaning. The chapter considers Colin McGinn's attempt to construe meaning and understanding in terms of the possession of abilities or capacities. It outlines Crispin Wright's attempt to respond to the sceptical argument by claiming that facts about meaning are 'judgement-dependent'. The chapter examines Wittgenstein's own response to the sceptical paradox, before discussing Hannah Ginsborg's recent invocation of primitive normative attitudes as a way of replying to KW's sceptic. It provides some brief comments on the relationship between scepticism about the notion of meaning as applied to expressions of public language, and scepticism about the content of states of mind.
