ABSTRACT
Dwight D. Eisenhower had received about 75 percent of the total party vote during the state’s primaries on April 22, and, although it was achieved with only Stassen in opposition, that figure was nevertheless more than 800,000 greater than the total Republican primary vote of 1940. The Pennsylvanians and others were concerned about the validity of the thesis that an Eisenhower candidacy would have great “coat-tail” strength. Professionals preferring Eisenhower had concluded that choosing the Senator was too risky; they and often the younger, more moderate or liberal political neophytes constituted the stop-Taft forces. The Eisenhower forces, denying the existence of a “hidden” conservative vote, had to present their man not only as a winner but as one who would thereby salvage the GOP by rescuing it from the feverish excesses of frustrating impotence. The Eisenhower candidacy, with its vast appeal to the so-called “middle of the road” of American politics, was anomalous with the Republican Congressional delegation.
