ABSTRACT
A central difficulty in analytic philosophy of education seems to reflect a soft spot in the analytic theory generally—how to judge what is a correct or adequate analysis. Insofar as the analysis is linguistic analysis, one would expect it to issue either in an empirical-linguistic outcome or in a phenomenological resolution—in both of which the decision of adequacy would be a factual issue—or in some pragmatic-evaluative judgment determined by the purposes of the specific inquiry. The first anomaly is the more formidable one. It concerns the distinction into types of learning that was the outcome of analytic grappling which began with Gilbert Ryle’s distinction between knowing that and knowing how. The relation between analysis and philosophy of education in the examples given illustrates the one-way sovereign stance: educational philosophy is the handmaiden of philosophy; philosophy furnishes the analytic products; and philosophy of education digs them up, brings them to teaching and structures learning and teaching.
