ABSTRACT
The standard objection to moral relativism is that it wickedly or self-defeatingly entails tolerance of what even the relativist regards as evil. His principles require him to wink at evil by declaring such practices morally and legally right as judged by the standards of those who engage in them. Or, anyhow, so say critics. In a justly famous paper, Gilbert Harman has provided a partial answer to this argumentum ad Nazium; but Harman's answer needs to be supplemented. There are many forms of relativism, and some of them cannot be defended in the way just indicated and soon to be explained. The Relativist rejects this identification of morality with reason while insisting on an identification of morality with convention. Absolutists claim that he does, but they cannot prove their claim merely by pointing out that the relativist's conceptions of rationality and morality are unacceptable to them. According to Fred Feldman, relativism entails tolerance of evil; and makes "social conflict" impossible.
